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 Effects of Capital Intensity on Firm Performance: U.S. Restaurant Industry 
 
Introduction 
The restaurant industry has several, recognizable unique industry characteristics, 
such as labor intensity, seasonality, and short distribution channels (Schmidgall, 
2006).  Among these industry characteristics, capital intensity also plays a role in 
explaining and determining the restaurant industry (Schmidgall, 2006; Surowiecki, 
1999).  Restaurants need to have physical buildings, equipment, fixtures, and 
furniture, all in-place upon launching a business; these infrastructural components 
require considerable capital investment.  Considering significance of the capital 
intensity for the restaurant industry, little literature and empirical findings exist in 
relation to the capital intensity to provide educational and practical knowledge, 
and thus, it is encouraging to investigate implications and effects of capital 
intensity for food service operations.  In particular, when understanding that the 
ultimate goal of financial managers is to maximize firm value (Andrew, Damitio 
& Schmidgall, 2007), an examination about effects of the capital intensity on 
restaurant corporations’ firm value should enlighten hospitality researchers and 
practitioners further, which is the main goal of this study. 
Some business factors with which capital intensity may have, directly or 
indirectly, a relationship, are business risk and value.  Being more capital 
intensive may increase business or firm risk due to the fact that significant 
fluctuations in an operation’s profitability are more likely for highly capital 
intensive businesses or firms (Shapiro & Titman, 1986).  The increase of risk can 
happen because a business with more fixed assets commits a high level of fixed 
costs in deriving its profitability due to the fact that the high volume of fixed cost 
do not vary according to the sales volume and thus cause higher fluctuations of 
profits (Brealey & Myers, 1984).  According to this argument, higher risk 
deriving from high capital intensity will lead to higher cost of capital that 
decreases a business’ value or a firm’s value performance.   
On the other hand, according to Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994), capital 
intensity may reduce business risk because firms with high capital intensity have 
already allocated a great amount of cash on fixed assets and thus may incur cost 
savings through subsequent, normal operations.  Risk reduction may be more 
pronounced during uncertain economic environments or economic downturns 
because of an ability to reduce some fixed costs.  Following this argument, 
restaurants with high capital intensity decrease risk and thus the cost of capital.  
Consequently, their firm’s value will be elevated. 
When total fixed assets, scaled by total revenues, is the measure of capital 
intensity, another characteristic of the restaurant industry, franchising, may play a 
role in determining the effect of capital intensity on firm risk and value.  An 
inverse relationship between franchising and the capital intensity measure (fixed 
 assets to revenues) may exist because as restaurant firms increasingly adopt 
franchising, they are more likely to own fewer properties or operating units 
compared to their sales level.  Many restaurant firms adopt franchising as their 
main expansion strategy because of implications related to risk and value 
(Andrew, et al., 2007).   
Based on the argument that franchising benefits franchisors (chain firms) 
with stable fee structures, chain restaurant firms should be able to reduce risk by 
adopting the franchising strategy; consequently, the reduction of risk should lead 
to reducing the cost of capital and increasing firm value.  Considering the inverse 
relationship between the franchising and the capital intensity measure, and the 
benefit of risk reduction from the franchising strategy, the restaurant setting may 
support a negative relationship between capital intensity and a firm’s value 
performance.  However, there are also negative sides of franchising.  Agency 
costs occur for franchisors to monitor franchisees’ operations or although 
franchisees go through a rigorous application process, it is also possible that 
franchisees may be poor operators to begin with.  In such cases, franchising will 
hurt firm value and thus suggest a positive relationship between capital intensity 
and a firm’s value performance. 
The current study, therefore, examines, for the U.S. restaurant industry, 
the effect of capital intensity on a firm’s value performance.  The investigation 
period spans 2000 to 2008, the most recent time periods.  The current study does 
not propose a directional hypothesis, but rather adopts an open position due to the 
mixed results proffered in the literature.  This study next reviews the literature, 
followed by descriptions of the methodology.  Results and discussions conclude 
the study. 
 
Literature Review 
Capital intensity is often considered a representative of a firm’s operating 
leverage (Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994), and levels of capital intensity vary 
among different industries.  Examples of capital intensive industries are mining, 
utilities, airlines, railroads, cruise lines, hotels, and restaurants (Schmidgall, 2006; 
Solution Matrix, n.d.).  Acknowledging that the hospitality industry (typically, 
hotels and restaurants) is capital intensive (Andrew, et al., 2007), the topic does 
not seem to have garnered extensive attention by hospitality industry researchers.  
One exception is Hsu and Jang’s (2008) study which examined determinants of 
unsystematic risk for hospitality firms and compared the determinants for hotels 
and restaurants.  As one of the determinants, that study investigated capital 
intensity and found a positive relationship between capital intensity and 
unsystematic risk; capital intensive hotel and restaurant firms presented high 
unsystematic risk, estimated by using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  
 However, little further examination seems to exist in the hospitality literature 
regarding capital intensity issues. 
General, financial economics literature has examined the relationship of 
capital intensity according to several factors, including cost of capital, firm 
performance, and risk.  Overall, the literature suggested mixed and inconclusive 
results.  Harris (1988) examined the effect of capital intensity on a firm’s price-
cost margin and found a positive effect: capital intensive firms showed higher 
price-cost margins. However, Martin (1983) and Harris (1986) found a negative 
effect for capital intensity on firm performance.  According to Scott and Pascoe 
(1984; 1986), some mixed findings might stem from a construct validity issue of 
the measure of capital intensity and model specification errors. 
Reitenga (2000) extended the Blacconiere and Patten (1994) study that 
examined effects of disclosure about environmental issues by incorporating the 
addition of capital intensity to the model to determine whether or not capital 
intensity imposes a positive effect on market returns.  Reitenga (2000) used an 
event study method from the Bhopal chemical accident and estimated cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs).  The study found a positive effect of capital intensity 
on CARs, suggesting that a great portion of already committed tangible structure 
of the firm may help decrease additional capital expenditures, and thus increase 
market returns. 
Literature on capital intensity and firm risk also shows inconclusive 
findings.  According to Brealey and Myers (1984) and Shapiro and Titman (1986), 
capital intensity represents a firm’s operating leverage and tends to increase a 
firm’s risk.  They formulated this argument because a firm’s sales level normally 
fluctuates more when the firm possesses a high level of fixed assets.  This 
condition is due to the fact that a great part of a firm’s cost structure does not vary 
according to sales levels, but remains fixed: When demand fluctuates, the 
profitability level of a capital intensive firm should fluctuate more than a less 
capital intensive firm. 
To the contrary, some researchers argued that capital intensity decreases a 
firm’s risk (Barton, 1988; Hurdle, 1974; Lubatkin and Chatterjee, 1994) because a 
capital intensive firm may reduce its costs, especially during economic downturns 
or uncertain economic environments, since a firm’s previously-committed or -
invested fixed structure does not require further capital investment or additional 
expenditures.  For example, Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) found a negative 
relationship between capital intensity and unsystematic risk. The findings support 
the view, but are inconsistent with the findings of Hsu and Jang (2008) for the 
hospitality context. 
In addition, when considering capital intensity in relation to a franchising 
strategy (an inverse relationship between the two factors), a restaurant industry 
specific expansion strategy, capital intensity may increase risk.  This is because, 
 following the modern portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952), a franchising strategy 
may aid restaurant firms diversifying their operations, and action that would 
decrease firm risk and thus increase firm value. Capital intensity, apparently, 
inversely related to the degree of franchising, would increase firm risk and thus 
decrease firm value.  Based on the various discussions currently available, the 
literature concerning capital intensity shows inconclusive and mixed results.  
Moreover, considering the important role of capital intensity in the restaurant 
industry, an interesting and valuable examination is the capital intensity issue in 
the restaurant business context.   
 
Methodology 
Model 
This study performs a pooled regression analysis to examine the effect of capital 
intensity on firm value.  The proposed model is: 
Qt = α0 + α1CI t + α2LEV t + α3SIZE t + α4 PROFIT t + α5URt + εt, 
where, Q represents a restaurant firm’s value performance, measured by Tobin’s 
Q, following Chung and Pruit (1994)’s approximate q (more detail explanation 
appears in the following section); CI represents a restaurant firm’s capital 
intensity, measured by total fixed assets scaled by total revenues; LEV represents 
a restaurant firm’s leverage, measured by total stockholders’ equity scaled by total 
liabilities; SIZE represents a restaurant firm’s size, measured by the log of 
revenues; PROFIT represents a restaurant firm’s profitability, measured by 
operating income before depreciation expense scaled by total assets; UR 
represents economic conditions, measured by unemployment rate; all ratios (Q, CI, 
LEV, and PROFIT) are in log form, and subscript, t, represents a time period. 
 
Dependent and Main Variables 
This study adopts Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable to represent a firm’s value 
performance.  Following Chung and Pruit (1994), this study uses approximate q 
and its definition is: approximate q = (MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA, where MVE is 
the product of a firm’s stock price and the number of common shares outstanding; 
PS represents the liquidating value of outstanding preferred shares; DEBT is the 
value of short-term liabilities, net of short-term assets plus the book value of long-
term assets, and TA represents the book value of total assets.  Tobin’s Q has been 
recognized as a measure that better reflects a firm’s performance than accounting 
and stock return measurements due to its ability to control for a firm’s risk and, at 
the same time, consider future perspectives about the firm (Jose, Nichols, & 
Stevens, 1986; Lang & Stulz, 1994).   
Capital intensity is the main variable of this study and its measure is fixed 
assets scaled by total revenues, following Miller (1986).  The expectation is that 
this variable positively impacts a firm’s value performance if the variable’s role of 
 reducing a firm risk holds, either according to the Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) 
argument or the franchising argument discussed earlier.  A negative impact from 
capital intensity on a firm’s value performance would exist if capital intensity 
increases a firm risk, as argued by Shapiro and Titman (1986).  This study does 
not support a particular argument, but rather examines the issue, non-directionally. 
 
Control Variables 
The main regression model includes four control variables: firm size, capital 
structure, profitability, and economic conditions.  The included firm size (SIZE) 
variable controls for any systematic impacts of a firm’s size on the relationship 
between capital intensity and a firm’s value performance because large firms may 
perform differently from small firms in terms of their values.  According to Banz 
(1981), smaller firms, on average, yield higher expected common stock returns 
than larger firms, while according to Ball (1978), small firms are riskier than 
larger firms; thus smaller firms are less valued compared to larger firms.  
Therefore, this study expects to find a positive effect from firm size on value 
performance.  A general expectation is that a firm’s capital structure imposes 
certain effects on the firm’s value through tax advantages from debt and risk 
implications involved an optimal debt level. This line of thinking follows the 
trade-off theory (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973) which does not support one 
direction.  According to the trade-off theory, a firm can enjoy tax advantages from 
raising its debt because interest expenses are tax deductible which will enhance 
the firm value.  However, the firm can enjoy such benefit only up to the point 
where the tax advantage outweighs bankruptcy costs.  Once the firm passes the 
point (i.e., optimal leverage point) (i.e., bankruptcy costs outweigh the tax 
benefit), the firm value will decrease.  Based on several hospitality financial 
studies (for example, Hsu & Jang, 2009; Koh, Lee & Boo, 2009; Lee, 2008), 
however, this study expects to show a negative effect of a firm’s capital structure 
on value performance.  The study measures the capital structure by leverage ratio 
(i.e., debt-to-equity ratio).  The model includes the third control variable, 
profitability, because profitability may relate to both capital intensity and a firm’s 
value performance.  Especially, a strong relationship between a firm’s 
profitability and value performance clearly encourages researchers to control for 
the factor.  This study anticipates finding a positive effect of profitability on a 
firm’s value performance.  Last, the study controls for economic conditions due to 
the expectation that firms may do better in terms of profits during good economic 
times, and the reverse during economic downturns.  Thus, the study expects to see 
a positive relationship between economic conditions and a firm’s value 
performance. 
 
Data 
 The current study uses the two data sources to examine the proposed research 
question: 1) the COMPUSTAT database for required financial data for the 
sampled restaurant firms, such as total assets, revenues, and stock prices, and 2) 
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics for annual unemployment rates.  The sample 
period spans 2000 to 2008, focusing exclusively on recent time periods, but still 
encompassing all different stages of economic cycles (i.e., recessionary, booming 
and steady).  All publicly traded restaurant firms were then retrieved from 
COMPUSTAT for the sample period, and the data set was cleaned by eliminating, 
first, those companies that do not operate restaurants as their main businesses, and 
second, those companies that are not based in the U.S.  After the cleaning process, 
the obtained number of observations was 579.  Then, an outlier check was 
performed and those outliers based on the cut-off of standardized residuals at the 
0.01 significance level were eliminated (Anderson, Sweeney, & Williams, 2005).  
After eight iterations of the outlier elimination process, the final sample attained 
for the main analysis was 524. 
 
Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
The study first performs a descriptive analysis with the variables included in the 
model.  Table 1 presents the results.  Tobin’s Q shows a mean value of 1.30, 
indicating that U.S. restaurant firms’ market related values are 1.30 times their 
replacement costs.  The minimum value of Tobin’s Q is 0.09 while the maximum 
value is 3.97.  Capital intensity, measured by dividing fixed assets by total 
revenues, ranges from 0.08 to 3.69, with a mean value of 0.47.  Leverage ratio 
shows a mean value of 1.43 with minimum (maximum) value of 0.12 (19.90).  
Revenues of the sampled restaurant firms are 1,140 USD in millions, on average, 
ranging from 7.62 USD to 23,522 USD in millions.  Last, the unemployment rate, 
in percentage, demonstrates a mean value of 5.09% with a minimum and 
maximum of 4% and 6%, respectively. 
Table 1 
Summary of Descriptive Statistics† 
Variable N Mean S.D. Minimum Maximum 
Tobin’s Q 524 1.30 0.72 0.09 3.97 
Capital Intensity 524 0.47 0.27 0.08 3.69 
Leverage 524 1.43 1.91 0.12 19.90 
Revenue (USD) 524 1,140 2,794 7.62 23,522 
Unemployment Rate (%) 524 5.09% 0.68% 4% 6% 
†Tobin’s Q is measured by approximate q as follows: [(MVE + PS + DEBT) / TA, where MVE is 
the product of a firm’s stock price and the number of common shares outstanding; PS represents 
the liquidating value of outstanding preferred shares; DEBT is the value of short-term liabilities, 
net of short-term assets plus the book value of long-term assets, and TA represents the book value 
 of total assets]; Capital Intensity is measured by dividing total fixed assets by total revenues, and 
Leverage is measured by dividing total liabilities by total stockholders’ equity. 
 
 The study, next, performs Pearson’s correlation analysis to examine a 
bivariate relationship among all variables introduced to the main regression model.  
The correlation analysis additionally provides insight regarding a potential 
multicollinearity problem among independent variables.  Table 2 presents results.  
Tobin’s Q shows a statistically significant correlation with all variables except 
unemployment rate (r = 0.02).  With capital intensity (r = 0.13), firm size (SIZE) 
(r = 0.48), and PROFIT (r = 0.71), a positive correlation exists while Tobin’s Q 
shows a negative correlation with leverage (LEV) (r = -0.12).  Capital intensity 
(CI) additionally shows a positive correlation with SIZE (r = 0.54) and PROFIT (r 
= 0.10) while LEV shows a negative correlation with PROFIT (r = -0.16) and a 
positive one with SIZE (r = 0.12).  PROFIT and SIZE are significantly and 
positively correlated with each other (r = 0.40), while unemployment rate is not 
significantly correlated with any of the examined variables. 
Table 2 
Summary of Pearson’s Correlation† 
Variable CI LEV SIZE PROFIT UR 
Q 0.13** -0.12** 0.48** 0.71** 0.02 
CI  -0.06 0.54** 0.10* 0.01 
LEV   0.12** -0.16** 0.00 
SIZE    0.40** 0.06 
PROFIT     0.03 
*
 and ** represent significance level of 5% and 1%, respectively. 
†Q represents a firm’s value performance and is measured by approximate q as follows: [(MVE + 
PS + DEBT) / TA, where MVE is the product of a firm’s stock price and the number of common 
shares outstanding; PS represents the liquidating value of outstanding preferred shares; DEBT is 
the value of short-term liabilities, net of short-term assets plus the book value of long-term assets, 
and TA represents the book value of total assets]; CI represents a firm’s capital intensity, 
measured by dividing total fixed assets by total revenues; LEV represents a firm’s leverage, 
measured by dividing total liabilities by total stockholders’ equity; SIZE represents a firm’s size, 
measured by log of revenues; PROFIT represents a firm’s profitability, measured by dividing 
operating income before depreciation expense by total assets; UR represents economic conditions, 
measured by unemployment rates, and all ratios (Q, CI, LEV, and PROFIT) are in log form. 
 
Main Findings 
To examine the proposed hypothesis, this study performed a pooled regression 
analysis.  The analysis, however, indicated a positive autocorrelation with 1.004 
of Durbin-Watson statistic.  Therefore, the study applied the Newey-West 
standard errors to the pooled regression results to control for autocorrelation and 
also potential heteroscedasticity issues (Newey & West, 1994).  The results 
appear in Table 3.  The analysis shows a good model fit with an F-value of 118.46 
 at a significance level less than 0.001 and an adjusted R-square of 0.53.  Capital 
intensity (CI), the main factor of this study, negatively impacts Tobin’s Q (Q) 
with a t-value of -2.82 (p-value of 0.005), supporting the hypothesis and the 
argument of Harris (1988) and Martin (1983).  Leverage (LEV) shows a negative 
effect on Q with a t-value of -2.87 (p-value of 0.004), consistent with many 
hospitality financial studies.  Firm size (SIZE) and PROFIT both show positive 
and significant effects on Q (t-value of 7.06 and 16.78, respectively) while 
unemployment rate (UR), representing economic conditions, does not have a 
significant coefficient (t-value = -0.91).  The study also estimates variance 
inflation factors (VIFs) for independent variables to check for a potential 
multicollinearity problem, and results suggest that no such problem exists; the 
largest VIF value is 1.81 for the firm size variable which is far less than a typical 
cut-off value of 10 (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998). 
Table 3 
Summary of Pooled Regression Analysis† 
Qt = α0 + α1CI t + α2LEV t + α3SIZE t + α4 PROFIT t + α5URt 
 Variable Coefficients t-value p-value VIF 
CI -0.20 -2.82** 0.005 1.46 
LEV -0.06 -2.87** 0.004 1.10 
SIZE 0.05 7.06*** < 0.001 1.81 
PROFIT 2.35 16.78*** < 0.001 1.31 
UR -0.01 -0.91 0.36 1.01 
N 524 
Adj R2 0.53 
F 118.46*** 
*
, 
**
 and *** represent significance level of 5%, 1%, and 0.01%, respectively. 
 
Discussions and Conclusions 
The current study attempts to investigate effects of capital intensity on firm value 
performance for publicly traded U.S. restaurant companies beginning in 2000.  
Since the previous literature provides mixed findings with regard to the effect of 
capital intensity on firm risk, and thus firm value, this study does not propose a 
directional, but rather non-directional hypothesis.  Findings suggest the negative 
effect of capital intensity on a firm’s value performance (measured by Tobin’s Q), 
implicitly supporting the literature: Capital intensity increases a firm’s risk 
(Brealey and Myers, 1984; Shapiro and Titman, 1986).   
The findings also support the argument made by this study that franchising 
may play a role in relating capital intensity measurement and a firm’s value 
performance.  Franchising strategies benefit chain restaurant companies by 
providing stable income, thus reducing business risk (Andrew, et al., 2007).  Such 
 risk reduction certainly helps restaurant firms improve their values.  When 
considering that the proxy that this study uses to represent capital intensity is 
fixed assets to total revenues, the measurement is expected to inversely relate to 
the degree of franchising.  This is because a restaurant firm with a greater degree 
of franchising would have a relatively smaller portion of fixed assets tied to its 
revenues because the company owns fewer properties and mainly generates 
revenues from franchising.  In such case, a negative impact of capital intensity on 
firm value can be hypothesized (i.e., a positive impact of franchising on firm 
value is expected).  A worthwhile future exploration would be this restaurant 
industry’s specific characteristic in the context of capital intensity because what 
this study proposes is speculation.   An empirical question remains: Does the 
franchising strategy have a direct relationship with capital intensity in regard to 
the effect on firm value? 
While finding a positive effect from a firm’s profitability on the value 
performance is not surprising, the strong (t-value is 10.09) and positive effect of a 
firm’s size on firm value is of interest.  While many previous studies support a 
positive relationship between firm size and value, many studies supported the 
opposite perspective which generates questions which of the two contradictory 
arguments for the firm size effect really holds for restaurant companies.  Based on 
this study’s findings, during the first nine years of this century, larger restaurant 
firms, in terms of their revenues, performed better than smaller restaurant firms in 
terms of their values.  Perhaps, this positive firm size effect on value occurred 
during the prescribed time period because of dramatic economic environment 
changes, including the 9/11 terror attack in 2001 and massive economic turmoil 
beginning in 2008.  Due to these severely fluctuating economic conditions, 
smaller companies may have been considered riskier than their counterpart, larger 
companies, and penalized for such risk by value reduction.  However, again, this 
issue is a question that needs empirical investigation and justification.  Thus, 
researchers are encouraged to examine this topic in future research. 
 Findings of this study have managerial implications.  First, for a value 
maximization point of view, restaurant executives and managers may consider a 
strategic approach to reduce their fixed assets when compared to their revenue 
levels.  One way to achieve such a goal is to increase the degree of franchising.  
By doing so, the proportion of fixed assets to revenues would decrease and value 
enhancement may be accomplished.  However, in such case, the assumption is 
that the franchising strategy is the driver of the value improvement, and again, 
more empirical examination should be conducted to build a more solid case for 
such an assumption.  The other way to decrease the proportion of fixed assets to 
revenues may be to sell unnecessary or obsolete assets.  However, such sales 
 should be valid consideration only after thorough evaluations.  Moreover, it 
should be noted that this recommendation assumes homogeneity of fixed assets. 
 For the restaurant investment community, this study’s findings may 
suggest that investors and analysts consider restaurant firms’ capital intensity as 
one of their evaluation tools or factors for determining investment portfolio.  For 
example, everything else being equal, capital intensity level may help investors 
decide company selections for portfolio.  However, further investigation to 
confirm this speculation is strongly encouraged, such as a comparison of 
portfolios based on different levels of capital intensity.  Hospitality financial 
educators and researchers may also derive some benefits from the findings when 
teaching students or when conducting research which relates to firm value 
performance or capital intensity.  For a model that examines the relationship 
among various independent variables with a firm’s value performance, 
researchers may want to consider capital intensity as a factor to be controlled. 
With the franchising argument by this study, some may propose to directly 
introduce the franchising variable to the model.  There are, however, two issues in 
regard to such idea.  First, the franchising variable will mostly have a very high 
correlation with the main variable of this study, capital intensity which will tend 
to cause multicollinearity problem.  The expected high correlation is the reason 
why the current manuscript makes certain speculations and implications in 
relation to the franchising strategy from the current findings.  Second, an 
inclusion of franchising variable would dramatically decrease the sample size.  
For example, Koh, et al. (2009) examined the franchising issue for the restaurant 
industry and came up with total sample size of 164 for 2000s (the current study’s 
sample size is 495).  Due to the two concerns discussed here, the study chose not 
to include the franchising variable. 
 This study is not free from limitations.  First, findings of this study may 
have limited generalizability due to the fact that the study sample only includes 
U.S. restaurant companies.  Consequently, the findings may not be applicable to 
non-U.S. restaurant companies.  Also, the sampled companies are publicly traded, 
thus application of findings to countless independent restaurant operators may not 
be appropriate.  Second, other strategic factors might impact a restaurant firm’s 
value performance, but these are not included in this study’s model.  Examples of 
such omitted variables are internationalization and various diversification 
strategies.  Incorporating those variables may enhance validity of the model even 
further, so future studies may consider inclusion of some of those omitted 
variables.  Last, although a positive impact of franchising strategy is implicitly 
speculated by this study’s findings, it is still an empirical question.  Thus, it is 
recommended to study this topic more explicitly in the future.    
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